Abstract: The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is one of the most common protocols that are used for signaling function in Voice over IP (VoIP) networks. The SIP protocol is very popular because of its flexibility, simplicity, and easy implementation, so it is a target of many attacks. In this paper, we propose a new system to detect the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (i.e. malformed message and invite flooding) and Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) attack in the SIP based VoIP networks using a linear Support Vector Machine with l 1 regularization (i.e. l 1 -SVM) classifier. In our approach, we project the SIP messages into a very high dimensional space using string based n-gram features. Hence, a linear classifier is trained on the top of these features. Our experimental results show that the proposed system detects malformed message, invite flooding, and SPIT attacks with a high accuracy. In addition, the proposed system outperformed other systems significantly in the detection speed.
Efficient Detection of Attacks in SIP Based VoIP Networks using Linear l 1 -SVM Classifier 519 used for products advertisement, harassment of subscribers, or convincing VoIP users to dial specific numbers. Recent statistics showed that spam calls result in huge man labor losses, especially for small business enterprises in the U.S. [32] .
In this paper, we developed a machine learning (ML) system that decreases VoIP-SIP attacks using a linear SVM classifier. Our contributions are: (i) Introducing a novel approach for VoIP-SIP attacks detection using a fast linear SVM classifier; (ii) Using l 1 regularizer in the objective function that leads to sparse solutions 1 ; (iii) Comparing our results with the published state-ofthe art systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the related work, with a focus on the ML approaches. In section 3, we describe the proposed approach to detect VoIP-SIP attacks. Data is explained in section 4. Experimental setup is illustrated in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper and discusses future work.
Related work
Decreasing VoIP attacks is a hot topic of research in the last few years. Hosseinpour et al. [9] used a Finite State Machine (FSM) to extract parameters of the SIP traffic in normal conditions. These parameters are used with fuzzy logic to detect DoS attacks. Tsiatsikas et al. [27] detected DoS attacks which exploit the SIP message body. They built a Session Description Protocol (SDP) parser using 100 rules, which achieved a high accuracy.
Machine learning (ML) is an artificial intelligence approach that creates a model to recognize some patterns based on training examples. The ML task usually consists of three phases: choosing a learning algorithm, training the algorithm using the training dataset, and evaluating the algorithm performance by running it on another dataset (test-dataset). The detection of VoIP-SIP attacks using ML methods is introduced in many research work. Nassar et al. [14] extracted a set of 38 features from a slice of SIP messages, a SVM classifier decides if this vector is anomaly or not and issues an event, the event correlator uses a set of rules and conditions to filter the classifier events and generates alarms when necessary.
Akbar et al. [2] introduced Packet-based SIP Intrusion Protector (PbSIP) to prevent SIP flooding attacks and SPIT. PbSIP contains a packet-based analyzer that uses a set of spatial and temporal features to reduce the required processing and memory, features computation module, and Naive Bayes and J48 classifiers. In addition, Asgharian et al. [3] introduced a set of 18 statistics features calculated from SIP headers. They used a SVM classifier to evaluate the proposed features. Pougajendy et al. [17] used a subset of [3] features plus 2 new features, they evaluated the proposed features using a SVM classifier.
Rieck et al. [18] converted the SIP message to a high-dimensional vector space using n-gram tokens. They measured the Euclidean distance between a new message and a built model to detect anomalous messages. Tang et al. [24] proposed a prevention and detection system of SIP flooding attacks. They integrated a three-dimensional sketch design with the Hellinger Distance (HD) technique.
In [23] Su et al. extracted 23 features to detect SPIT attacks using k-nearest neighbor classifier. They added weight to each feature using a genetic algorithm. Vennila et al. [29] introduced two phases model; a SVM classifier to classify the traffic into VoIP and non-VoIP, and an entropy model to classify the VoIP traffic into flooding and non-flooding. Later, in [30] they proposed another two phases model to detect SPIT callers, which used Markov Chain, and incremental SVM classifier.
In [25] Tsiatsikas et al. proposed an offline system to detect Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks, they calculated the occurrence of 6 mandatory headers of SIP message, and implemented headers anonymization using HMAC. They tried 5 classifiers to find the best false alarm rate. Later, in [26] they proposed a real-time detection system and tried a group of DDoS scenarios.
Akbar et al. [1] used kernel tree analysis instead of features extraction, and a SVM classifier to detect malformed DDos attacks. In [21] Semerci et al. detected DDoS attacks using a change-point method which detects the change of Mahalanobis distance between successive feature vectors. If the change exceeds a threshold, the system labeled this as an attack. Kurt et al. [12] extracted a set of features from SIP messages and server logs. A Hidden Markov Model was used to relate these features to hidden variables, and a Bayesian multiple change model used these variables as change point indicators to detect DDoS flooding attacks. Le et al. [13] built a large data-set using a developed interface over a mobile application, which enables the user to label the malicious calls. They started with 29 features and reduced them to 10 features. Many machine learning models were tried (i.e. SVM and neural networks).
We observed a few issues in the developed systems described above. The feature extraction methods based on hand-crafted features are not generic, and tuned for specific datasets and attacks [3, 14, 23] . Hence, there is a need to develop a generic feature extraction method that is suitable for many attacks. Besides, the classification approaches based on distance measures and static threshold are not immune to noisy datasets [9, 29] . Moreover, the dual SVM methods are known to be slow due to the kernel calculations [1, 17] . Furthermore, low detection accuracy in general [21] or in case of low-rate attack [24] were observed. Lastly, rules-based systems require deep knowledge of SIP and numerous manual work [27] .
These drawbacks led to the need for a system to detect VoIP-SIP attacks with high detection accuracy and a little processing time. To achieve this, we used the n-gram technique to extract features from SIP messages, and linear l 1 -SVM to classify these messages into normal or attack.
Proposed approach
Detection of SIP attacks is formulated based on a ML approach. It consists of two steps. The first step is to project the messages into a high-dimensional space since they are more likely to be linearly separable than low-dimensional space [5] , as illustrated in Figure 1 . A method based on extracting n-gram tokens from a SIP message is used to generate the high-dimensional space. The second step is to use a linear SVM classifier with l 1 regularization to detect the SIP attacks. This classification algorithm optimizes the primal soft-margin objective function, and it is much faster than optimizing the dual objective functions with kernels that were used in the previous research [3, 14, 17] .
Features extraction
In order to classify the SIP messages into normal or attack, the SIP messages are converted into numerical feature vectors. The features can be based on heuristics and domain knowledge as in [3, 23] . The disadvantage of this approach is that the generated features do not capture the diversity of the SIP messages, and they are highly tuned for specific attacks. Alternatively, they can be generated using a generic mathematical method like n-gram tokens as in [18] . The n-gram methods are widely used in speech and language processing [11] and in the network intrusion detection [31] .
The SIP message is converted to a feature vector by moving a window of length n over the message and extracting all sub-strings (n-gram tokens). The length of the feature vector equals the number of unique n-grams in the training set. For each n-gram, we compute the number Efficient Detection of Attacks in SIP Based VoIP Networks using Linear l 1 -SVM Classifier 521 Although the extraction of features based on n-gram tokens provides a generic and an effective way for representing the SIP message, the length of the resulting feature vector is very large, which slows down the detection speed in the classification process. To overcome this problem, we set a cutoff hyper-parameter, and add to the feature vector the n-grams that exceed the cutoff.
Linear l 1 -SVM classifier
Given a training set D that has m examples:
where y i are either 1 or -1, each indicating the class to which the point x i belongs (i.e. normal or attack). Each x i is a d-dimensional real vector (i.e. the unique numbers of n−gram tokens in the training set). The soft-margin SVM classifier is computed by minimizing the primal objective function given by:
where w is the vector of the parameters and max (0, 1 − y i (w · x i − b)) is the hinge loss function. The term w 2 is the l 2 regularization penalty. The hyper-parameter λ is used to determine the trade-off between increasing the margin-size and ensuring that the x i lie on the correct side of the margin. The l 2 regularization penalty in Equation 2 does not lead to sparse solutions. The l 1 = w regularizer or Lasso penalty is often used to increase the model sparseness since it can lead to solutions that have some elements with zero values [8] . In the proposed system, regularization is implemented by adding the l 1 norm penalty term to the hinge loss criterion (i.e. linear l 1 -SVM classifier):
In real implementation of Equation 3, the hinge loss is weighted by C:
where the hyper-parameter C = 
where c is the class identifier and b is a bias term. The primal objective function in Equation 2 is commonly solved using a dual form with the Lagrangian [4, 28] . The dual form is given by: ; for all i.
where α are the parameters to optimize and k(x i · x j ) is a kernel function. Some common kernels functions are: Polynomial (homogeneous):
, for γ > 0, and Hyperbolic tangent: k(x i , x j ) = tanh(κx i · x j + c), for some (not every) κ > 0 and c < 0. The new points z can be classified by computing:
The main advantage of the dual form solution is producing a nonlinear classifier. However, it is slow in training (i.e. O(m 2 )) and classification phases due to the usage of kernels [3, 14, 17] . On Efficient Detection of Attacks in SIP Based VoIP Networks using Linear l 1 -SVM Classifier 523 the other hand, the linear l 1 -SVM classifier optimizes the primal soft-margin objective function, and is much faster than optimizing the dual objective functions with kernels. The detection time is an important factor in the detection of attacks, and the dual form classifiers (i.e. Equation 8) may not be suitable for this task. The linear l 1 -SVM classifier detection in Equation 5 is relatively fast. Hence, our main classifier is based on the primal form objective function solutions.
Data
To evaluate the proposed system, we need VoIP datasets. Unfortunately, real VoIP datasets are not available because of privacy concerns, so we used two generated datasets.
The first dataset was produced by INRIA [15] . They used two SIP proxy servers (i.e. Opensips and Asterisk), and VoIP attack tools to generate different scenarios of the invite flooding and SPIT attacks. The test-bed consists of a PC that acts as a server, two PCs generate the normal traffic using VoIP bots, and a PC that generates the attack messages. This dataset contains about 266,450 SIP messages.
In addition, the SIP-Msg-Gen tool [7] was used to generate the second dataset. It is a synthetic SIP message generator that generates normal SIP messages according to the SIP grammar defined in the RFC 3261 [19] , and malformed SIP messages according to the SIP test messages defined in RFC 4475 [22] . The SIP-Msg-Gen tool can generate 14 different scenarios of the malformed SIP messages. All of these scenarios were used in the dataset generation. This dataset contains about 246,750 SIP messages.
For all experiments, we divided each dataset into three parts, 60% for training, 20% for cross validation, and 20% for testing. The training dataset was used to build the classification model. The cross validation dataset was used to tune the model hyper-parameters, and the test dataset was used to evaluate the final detection accuracy of the model.
Experiments
In this section, we evaluated the proposed approach using INRIA and SIP-Msg-Gen datasets. We projected the SIP messages into a high-dimensional space, and a linear l 1 -SVM classifier was used for detection. In our proposed system we aim to achieve fast and high detection accuracy. Hence, we turned our attention to the primal form SVMs with l 1 regularization (i.e. linear l 1 -SVM) to produce a sparse solution that will accelerate the detection process and decrease the number of active features. We compared the primal form SVMs with the dual form SVMs classifier. LibLinear [6] was used for the primal form l 1 -SVM experiments. It is an open source library that solves large scale linear classification problems, and supports l 1 and l 2 regularizations. In addition, the LibSVM toolkit [10] was sued for dual form SVM experiments. All experiments are done in a machine with Intel Core i5 CPU, 3.2 GHz Quad-core and 8 GB RAM memory.
Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our proposed model, we used F1 score [20] . It is the harmonic average of the precision and recall that takes into account the false positives and false negatives. The precision is the number of positive predictions divided by the total number of positive class predicted: 
The F1 score is given by:
where the precision and recall equally contributed into F1 score. The best F1 score is 1 and the worst is 0. The F1 score is usually more useful than accuracy, especially in case of different classes distribution. The model sparseness was measured using the compression ratio (CR) criterion, given by
where #Param is the number of features before the training process and #Pram(C) is the number of features after the training process, and is a function of the C parameter. The target of the proposed system is to maximize the detection accuracy and minimize the required time for message classification. The average detection time T detection is computed as follows:
where the features extraction time is the total time required to compute the features for all messages in the test dataset and the detection time is the total time required to run the l 1 -SVM classifier on the test dataset. The average train time T train was computed using the same equation but over the training dataset.
Results
The proposed classifier was trained using the training dataset and different values of the hyper-parameter C were tried to achieve the best detection accuracy. The F1 score, T detection , CR (C), and T train were reported for these experiments.
Our first experiment was performed on INRIA dataset, the feature vectors were created using n-gram with n=4 and cutoff=5. All n-grams that existed in the training dataset more than 5 times are stored in the dictionary, the dictionary of INRIA dataset have 120,209 4-grams. This dictionary was used to create feature vectors for the cross validation and the test datasets. Then the primal form l 1 -SVM classifier was tried with different C values.
In the second experiment, we used SIP-Msg-Gen dataset with the same hyper-parameters (n=4 and cutoff=5), and the dictionary has 290,166 4-grams. The size of this dictionary is bigger than the INRIA dictionary because the malformed messages usually contain random content.
The F1 Score for INRIA and SIP-Msg-Gen datasets with different C values is shown in figure 3 . For INRIA dataset, the l1-primal SVM classifier achieved 100% detection accuracy at C= 0.0039063 using only 37 features out of the 120,209 in 0.737 milliseconds average detection time per message. For the SIP-Msg-Gen dataset, the 100% detection accuracy is achieved at C= 0.5 using 9,800 features out of the 290,166 features in 0.570 milliseconds. Figure 4 shows the results of CR for INRIA and SIP-Msg-Gen datasets. Because a high detection accuracy was achieved with a few number of features, the compression ratio for both datasets is high. INRIA achived 99% compression ratio while SIP-Msg-Gen achieved 96% compression ratio.
Efficient Detection of Attacks in SIP Based VoIP Networks using Linear l 1 -SVM Classifier 525 The SIP-Msg-Gen dataset contains malformed messages, which usually have random content more than the invite flooding and SPIT messages in INRIA dataset. Hence, the l 1 -SVM primal classifier needs more features with the SIP-Msg-Gen dataset to achieve high accuracy, and this leads to the low compression ratio with this dataset compared with the INRIA dataset. Moreover, we calculated the proposed system throughput in megabits per second (Mbps) to measure the run-time performance. We achieved 2,700 Mbps using INRIA dataset, and 2,500 Mbps using SIP-Msg-Gen dataset which is considered a high throughput compared with previous work such as [18] .
One of the important constraints for any learning algorithm is its scalability. When dealing with very large datasets, the dual form SVMs with kernels will be much slower than the primal form SVMs in detection and training. Although a fast detection is important, the fast training is also important especially in the case of the online adaption of the system.
Comparing between the dual form SVM with RBF kernel and the primal form SVM when both of them achieved 100% detection accuracy is given in Table 1 . The primal form training time was about 17 times faster than the dual form using the INRIA dataset, and about 400 times faster with the SIP-Msg-Gen dataset. The detection time of the primal form was about 13 times faster than the dual form using the INRIA dataset, and about 100 times faster with the SIP-Msg-Gen dataset. This dual form setup is similar to the one used in [3] . Finally, we compared our linear l 1 -SVM classifier to the state-of-the-art systems in Table  2 . This comparison can only be considered as an indicator that the linear l 1 -SVM classifier outperforms the other systems in terms of speed (detection time), because many factors such as the hardware configuration and the test dataset are different. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a machine learning system to detect the attacks of SIP based VoIP networks. The system projects the messages into a high-dimensional feature vector using n-gram
